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WHAT DO MARRIAGE AND WELFARE
REFORM REALLY HAVE IN COMMON? A




In 1996, Congress passed a welfare reform bill that aimed
to "end welfare as we know it."' This bill replaced Aid to
Families with Dependant Children, a decades-old welfare
bill.2 Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Reconciliation Act of 1996, which created the block grant
system of Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).3 TANF
attempted to overhaul an outdated and inefficient public
assistance program by creating new goals and setting higher
standards. 4 TANF imposes new rigorous work requirements 5,
statewide goals of employment 6, marriage and independence
from welfare 7, and sanctions on states who are not meeting
J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University.
1 See Bill Clinton, Transcript of Speech by Clinton Accepting Democratic Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1992, at A14 (citing to portion of Presidential nomination speech by
then Gov. Bill Clinton to Democratic National Convention discussing New Covenant's
approach to welfare); see also A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End
Justify the Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 252-54 (2001) (noting new PRWRA welfare
legislation and TANF block-grant system have ended welfare "as we know it").
2 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-15 (2006). AFDC was revived in 1960's as part of
system of social reform. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (2006).
3 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104
P.L. 193 (1996). TANF was passed on August 21, 1996 as part of the PRWRA.
4 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 601 (setting forth several goals of new legislation); see also
Dickerson, supra note 1, at 253-54 (noting TANF to have ended welfare "as we know it").
5 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1) (imposing minimum average number of work hours per week in
certain qualified activities).
6 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1) (stating that to receive grant state has to achieve minimum
participation rate with respect to all families receiving assistance under State program
funded under this section).
7 42 U.S.C. § 601 (highlighting one of purposes of Act is ending dependence of needy
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requirements. 8 This paper will discuss the legitimacy of the
TANF goals, specifically marriage promotion initiatives. In
addition, this note will raise constitutional challenges to
TANF's marriage goals and methods, and make policy
recommendations that are aimed at helping families rise
above the poverty line, and not simply off the welfare rolls.
TANF was an attempt to overhaul welfare and effectively
change the state of welfare in this country. 9 Unfortunately,
this bill ignores the truths of poverty that are the real
reasons people enroll in public assistance.lO Marriage
promotion programs are just one example of the disconnect
this legislation illustrates. 1 TANF does not properly reflect
the reality faced everyday by the poor, but instead introduced
a goals-based system of incentives and penalties that assume
a welfare mother has control over her lifestyle, or, more
frankly, that she chooses to be poor. 12 It presumes, therefore,
that if given the proper incentive, she can also choose not to
be poor.13 This is simply not the case. Marriage promotion
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work and marriage).
8 42 U.S.C. § 609 (2006) (specifying the general penalties of reduction in grant money
for regular violations as well as enhanced penalties for intentional violations and misuse
of competitive welfare-to-work funds).
9 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 252-54 (noting TANF to have ended welfare "as we
know it"); see also Jennifer E. Spreng, When 'Welfare" Becomes 'Work Support"
Exempting Earned Income Tax Credit Payments in Consumer Bankruptcy, 78 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 279, 281 (2004) (finding 1996 to be end of "old welfare system with its focus on case
payments to poor women with children only if they did not work.").
10 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 254-56 (discussing "mandatory work requirements"
of TANF); see also Herman Schwartz, Why Losing Food Stamps is Now Part of the War on
Drugs, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at M2 (noting that people convicted of drug-related
felonies can no longer receive food stamps).
11 See Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and Privatization of
Dependency, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 458 (2005) (suggesting that
disconnect exists between fiscal situation of poor people, and social conservatives' view of
traditional family); see also Linda Gordon, Who Deserves Help? Who Must Provide?, 577
ANNALS 12, 13 (2001) (finding it "problematic" that society finds women's dependence on
male earnings to be "desirable social goal.").
12 See Cossman, supra note 11, at 458-59 (stating that "the efforts to reform welfare
eligibility and entitlements have focused on the other irresponsible citizen in fiscal,
libertarian and social conservative stories of welfare: the single mother"); see also Karen
Syma Czapanskiy, Symposium: Domestic Violence and the Maryland Family Violence
Option, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 447, 450 (2003) (noting that "structural
obstacles do not count as reasons for a woman's inability to become self-sufficient.").
13 See Linda Burnham, Welfare Reform, Family Hardship, and Women of Color, 577
ANNALS 38, 40 (2001) (highlighting "absurd and agonizing" decision women must face
concerning "whether to feed their children or house them"); see also Cossman, supra note
11, at 459 (suggesting that "welfare mother's reliance on the state" would end if all
"welfare mothers" either married or began working).
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programs exemplify the false assumptions made about the
situation a poor mother finds herself in.14 Effectively TANF
says that a poor mother is simply making the wrong choice,
and that we, as a nation, know that marriage is the proper
solution.
I. TEMPORARY AID TO NEEDY FAMILIES
Temporary Aid to Needy Families was passed as part of the
larger Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996.15 This Act abolished the former
Aid to Families with Dependant Children and replaced it
with the block grant system of TANF.16 TANF allows states
to construct their own welfare systems within certain
guidelines and performance percentages.17  TANF also
restricts the time recipients may receive assistance to five
years.' 8 TANF has four specific goals that the Act seeks to
pursue: (1) "[P]rovide assistance to needy families so that
children may be cared for in their homes or in the homes of
relatives,"19 (2) "end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work and
marriage," 20 (3) "prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-
wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for
preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies" 21
14 See Gordon, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing "how women's and children's
disproportionate poverty derives from the gender structures of society"); see also
Czapanskiy, supra note 12, at 450 (noting welfare reform to insist on "personal
responsibility").
15 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104
P.L. 193 (1996); see Dickerson, supra note 1, at 252-53 (explaining intentions of giving
"states authority to exercise maximum flexibility to design their own welfare programs"
through the Act).
16 See generally 104 P.L. 193 (1996). See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (2006) for an example of
the AFCD legislation.
17 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2006). This section lays out mandatory work requirements of the
Act. The Act defines work participation percentages for each year following enactment in
1996. For example, in 1998, at least thirty percent of the state's TANF recipients must be
participating in work programs. Id.
18 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7).
19 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1).
20 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2).
21 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3).
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and, (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two
parent families." 22
Congressional findings stated in TANF help to illustrate
the purpose and commitment to these goals. The first stated
congressional finding is that "marriage is the foundation of a
successful society."23 Followed by, "marriage is an essential
institution of a successful society which promotes the
interests of children."24 Congress continues with a list of
findings related to pre-marital childbirths and teen
pregnancy, as related to the incidences of children receiving
public assistance. 25 The importance that Congress places on
each of these issues, marriage in particular, is evidenced by
the significance stressed in the findings. Marriage is the first
issue addressed, which suggests that it was foremost in the
minds of the policy makers. 26 While it is recognized that
marriage is a very significant and celebrated event in an
individual's life, many question the legitimacy of using TANF
funds to promote this type of social contract between two
people. 27
22 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4).
23 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L.
104-193, Title I, § 101(1).
24 P.L. 104-193, Title I, § 101(2).
25 P.L. 104-193, Title I, § 101(2-10) (stating such findings as the number of
individuals receiving aid to families with dependent children has more than tripled since
1965 with more than two-thirds of recipients being children, and that increase in number
of children receiving public assistance is closely related to increase in births to unmarried
women).
26 P.L. 104-193, Title I, § 101(1); see Cossman, supra note 11, at 471 (discussing how
Congressional findings emphasize importance of traditional family).
27 See generally FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, TESTIMONY OF THE FAMILY
VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND ON WELFARE REFORM AND MARRIAGE PROMOTION
INITIATIVES, SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE (2005),
http://Endabuse.org/programs/publicpolicy/files/MarriageTestimony.pdf [hereinafter
ENDABUSE] (discussing various reasons why using TANF funds to promote marriage
might not be legitimate including high rates of domestic violence among TANF
recipients); NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, TANF REAUTHORIZATION:
SUMMARY OF MARRIAGE PROMOTION PROVISIONS IN HOUSE AND SENATE FINANCE
VERSIONS OF H.R. 4 (2003), http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/wel
HR4MarriageSummary.pdf [hereinafter NOW]
(stating some reasons as to why government-funded marriage programs are controversial,
such as they place domestic violence victims at greater risk of harm).
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II. INITIAL REACTIONS TO MARRIAGE PROMOTION
Marriage has traditionally been a social institution
regulated by the states, but not without federal intrusion. 28
Over time however, marriage has become one of numerous
choices two people can choose to pursue, rather then the
ultimate affirmation of ones role in society.29 Women have
many more options then they were once afforded. Notably,
one such option is the decision not to marry. With the
introduction of TANF, Congress waged a political attack
against this choice, particularly with marriage promotion
initiatives. These programs attempt to encourage marriage
by highlighting only the positives of matrimony and ignoring
the realities of married life for a low-income family. 30
TANF raises many questions about the proper role the
government should play in marriage decisions. Specifically,
many family law scholars question the role marriage
continues to play in our society. 31 For example, distinguished
family law scholar Harry Krause argues that:
28 See W. Todd Akin, Symposium on Marriage and the Law Essays, Debunking
"Conservative"Arguments Against the Federal Marriage Amendment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 219, 220 (2004) (stating that many conservatives maintain that
"marriage has been and should remain under the rightful jurisdiction of the states."); see
also Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage, 9
VA. J. Soc. PoVy & L. 163, 176 (2001) ("[T]hese ... legislative developments have
reopened the question about whether there is indeed a public interest in marriage, and if
there is, what role the federal (and state) government should play to strengthen and
possibly shape the institution.').
29 See Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same-Sex-
Or Not At All?, 34 FAM. L. Q. 271, 275-76 (2000) (listing numerous choices couples have
besides institution of marriage and how today's society offers broad variety of lifestyles for
sexual partners including more unmarried relationships with or without children); see
also Ooms, supra note 28, at 164-165 (discussing historian Nancy Cott's analysis of the
evolution of marriage roles).
30 See Patrick F. Fagan et al., Marriage: Still the Safest Place For Women and
Children, (March 9, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Familybg1732.cfm (listing
many positives about the institution of marriage, such as married women with children
suffer less abuse than single mothers with children); see also Robert E. Rector, Marriage
Promotion, Marriage Promotion, ISSUES 2006: THE CANDIDATE'S BRIEFING BOOK 105, 105
(The Heritage Foundation 2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/features/issues/
issuearealMarriagePromotion.cfm ('The beneficial effects of marriage, both for individuals
and for society, are beyond reasonable dispute. There is a broad and growing consensus
that government policy should promote rather than discourage healthy marriage.").
31 See Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should
the Law Support Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POLY 225, 228-29 (2004)
("Among family law scholars, this view of marriage as primarily an emotional good
created by the private couple leads to calls.., to abolish any distinction between
cohabitation and marriage, between what some call formal and informal unions."); see
2007]
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"[t]oday's sexual and associational lifestyles differ so much that the
state should not continue to deal with them as though they were one:
the old role-divided, procreative marriage of history. That marriage
may not be history, but it should be seen for what it has become: one
lifestyle choice among many."32
Krause's argument continues by evaluating current tax
laws. Krause argues that the informal distinctions between
married couples and couples who cohabitate have blurred
considerably, to the point where the tax law treats married
and unmarried couples in similar factual situations,
differently. 33 Krause argues that this distinction, which
treats marriage as a tax event that triggers added legal
benefits and obligations, should be extended to couples who
engage in formal cohabitation as well. 34 This is an interesting
argument when placed in the context of TANF marriage
promotion programs. The congressional findings for TANF
suggest that marriage is the ultimate structure for the well
being of a child.35 However, if the current trend in
socialization is away from marriage and toward more
informal cohabitation arrangements, should policy makers
consider this? Moreover, studies suggest that child
development is most affected by economic stability, not
necessarily marriage. 36 It is asserted that the legitimate
goals of TANF should be to establish situations where the
family is economically independent, so parents can offer their
children a more stable living environment. 37 While marriage
also Krause, supra note 29, at 276 (arguing blurred lines between formal cohabitation and
marriage).
32 Krause, supra note 29, at 276.
33 Id. at 278 (arguing that married or unmarried couples who are in the same factual
positions should be treated equally).
34 Id. (arguing that modern relationships are no longer defined by marriage, and that
law should reflect this collective shift).
35 P.L. 104-193, Title I, § 101(2) ('Marriage is an essential institution of a successful
society which promotes the interests of children.").
36 See Henry Ricciuti, Single Parenthood, Achievement, and Problem Behavior in
White, Black and Hispanic Children, 97 J. EDUC. RES. 196-206 (2004) (suggesting that
children whose parent or parents are not economically stable suffer due to a lack of
resources that enhance the children's care, socialization, and educational development);
see also ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 7 (arguing that parents who have educational
opportunities that extend beyond high school have drastically increased earning ability,
and are better able to provide for their children which in turn leads to better upbringing
for their child).
37 See Angela Hooton, Note, From Welfare Recipient To Childcare Worker: Balancing
[Vol. 21:3
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increases the possibility of economic stability, it is not the
ultimate answer. Legislation should reflect social realities,
and the reality for most poor women is that marriage is one
choice, among many others, but it is not necessarily the best,
or only option for their families.
American Prospect writer Kathryn Edin suggests more and
more poor couples choose cohabitation over marriage to
ensure some sort of financial security for their children.3 8 The
four most prominent reasons she cites for non-marriage are
affordability, respectability, trust, and control. 39 Edin argues
that mothers seek stability for their children, and for most
mothers who receive public assistance, marriage is simply not
a viable option.40 These women seek independence first. Edin
suggests that a woman who is financially stable is more
willing to marry because it enhances her bargaining power in
a relationship. 41 Additionally, these women cite the lack of
marriageable men in the neighborhood in which they live. 42
Men who are unemployed or involved in illegal activities are
not suitable candidates because of the instability they could
bring into the home.43 Poor mothers, just like any other
Work And Family Under TANF, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 121, 125-26 (2002) (stating that
one goal of TANF is to reduce parental dependence on government benefits); see also
Christie N. Love, Not in Our Country? A Critique of the United States Welfare System
Through the Lens of China's One-Child Law, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 142, 164 n.112
(2005) (finding that studies have shown that TANF can have positive effect on low-income
couples' stability).
38 See Kathryn Edin, Why Poor Women Don't Remarry, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 3, 2000),
http://www.prospect.org/print/V1I/4/edin-k.html (discussing survey of nearly 400 low-
income single mothers in four different U.S. cities).
39 Id. (finding common trend among poor single mothers weighing their financial and
emotional risks against benefits of marriage).
40 Id. ("[Llow-income single mothers believe that marriage will probably make their
lives more difficult.").
41 Id. ("A good marriage from the woman's point of view is one where she contributes
financially so that she has a say in the decision making.").
42 See Edin, supra note 38 (stating that women feel marriage comes with more risk
than reward when talking about the men who live in the same neighborhood as them); see
also KRISTIN S. SEEFELDT & PAMELA J. SMOCK, NATIONAL POVERTY CTR., MARRIAGE ON
THE PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA: WHAT DO POLICY MAKERS NEED TO KNOW FROM RESEARCH?
6 (2004), http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/workingpaper04/paper2/04-02.pdf
[hereinafter NPC] (arguing that erosion of earnings coupled with disproportionately high
incarceration rates have led to reduction of marriageable men in low income
communities).
43 See Bruce Chapman, Editorial, Adoption is an Orphan, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1989,
at A27 (stating children raised around drugs, crime and poverty are likely to experience
family instability); see also Edin, supra note 38 ("Drug money cannot buy marriage or
even long-term co-residence.").
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mother, recognize this danger and refuse to settle for a
situation that could be potentially harmful to their children.
By choosing to ignore this reality, marriage promotion
programs choose to ignore the realities of TANF families.44
Cohabitation is a more attractive option for women living in
low-income communities because there are no legal
consequences, which in turn often means less financial
consequence. 45 TANF mothers cannot afford extra-familial
expenses, because this choice would take money away from
their children. 46 For many welfare mothers, marriage is
simply not always the responsible choice.
III. THE FAILURE OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION PROGRAMS
Behavior-modification programs attempt to offer incentives
or impose penalties to encourage certain types of desired
behaviors. 47 These policies were introduced into the welfare
discourse as an attempt to integrate the welfare population
into mainstream. 48 Older models of behavior modification
44 See P.L. 104-193, Title I, § 101(2) ("Marriage is an essential institution of a
successful society which promotes the interests of children."). But see Edin, supra note 38
(describing stories told by mothers about both their children's fathers and other
boyfriends who leave children home alone, drink heavily, do drugs, and neglect or even
abuse the children); see also Betty Holcomb, Conservatives Push for Marriage Promotion
Programs, Women's e-News (Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.womensenews
.org/article.cfm/dynlaidl1073 (suggesting some impoverished women are forced to choose
between government funds and an unsafe marriage).
45 See Edin, supra note 38 ("Deferring or avoiding marriage allows mothers to
substitute an economically productive male for an unproductive one, should the need
arise. Divorce takes both time and money, both of which these mothers find in short
supply."); see also ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing the high divorce rate and
uncertainty that marriage will end women's economic problems).
46 See Robert B. Reich, Marriage Aid that Misses the Point, WASH. POST, Jan. 22,
2004, at A25 (positing that when an impoverished woman marries an equally
impoverished male she may end up having to support him as well at the expense of her
children); see also Editorial, Heartless Marriage Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A14
(concluding poor woman desire marriage but they lack access to mature, responsible
mates).
47 See Brad D. De Noble, Reduction of Welfare Dependency Via Incentives to
Recipients-Commendable Goal, But at What Cost?, 32 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L.
885, 887-88 (1994) (discussing Learnfare's attendance policy in order to receive AFDC
money); see also Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification
Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L. J. 719, 727, 736 (1992) (listing financial sanctions
mandated by Learnfare for students who miss certain amount of classes as well as
reductions in benefits under the Family Cap program for additional children conceived
after mother begins receiving AFDC).
48 See De Noble, supra note 47, at 886 (stating Learnfare promotes education of
children with the goal of creating a self-sufficient adult); see also Williams, supra note 47,
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programs such as Learnfare,49 or Family Cap50 have proven
unsuccessful for a multitude of reasons. 51 Lucy Williams52
argues that one reason for the failure of these programs is the
use of policies based on misguided assumptions of a causal
connection between poverty and conscious decisions. 53
Williams argues that lawmakers wrongly rely upon a series of
false assumptions about the moral character and psyche of
the poor. 54 The catalyst for this type of thinking is that
welfare is a social contract, made with the government by the
recipient that she or he will act in a certain morally
acceptable way (as determined by the government). 55
Learnfare was first introduced in Wisconsin in 1987,56 and
was expanded at the beginning of the 1988 school year to
include all teen dependants living with a parent. 57 The goal of
the program was to reduce teen truancy by ensuring that
at 720 (discussing how proponents of welfare reform argued that the requirements for
AFDC benefits would result in AFDC recipients becoming more productive members of
society).
49 See WIS. STAT. § 49.26 (2006); see also Williams, supra note 47. Learnfare was
introduced by former Wisconsin Governor Tommy G. Thompson as a method to curb high
school truancy of welfare children. Id. at 736.
50 See N.J. STAT. § 44: 10-61 (2006); see also Williams, supra note 47. Family Cap was
an attempt to force poor women to abstain from having additional children once they were
receiving public assistance. Id. at 736.
51 See Williams, supra note 47, at 746 ('This attempt to use economic motivation to
create changed behavior in AFDC mothers and children leads to 'solutions' that are
contrary to empirical evidence and thus cannot solve the problems for which they are
ostensibly designed. 'Welfare reform' programs such as Learnfare or Family Cap do not
solve burgeoning social problems; they reflect only political expedience and culturally
biased mythology."). But see De Noble, supra note 47, at 888 (highlighting arguments for
seeing Learnfare as both a success and failure depending on personal opinion).
52 Associate Professor, Northeastern University Law School; A.B. 1969, Baylor
University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago.
53 See Williams, supra note 47, at 734 (discussing how Learnfare assumes the mother
is at fault for her child's behavior and ignores the fact that some teens will not respond to
any incentive program and thus will not attend school even if it means less money for the
family).
54 Id. at 736 (stating the program was premised on superficial notions about the
psychology of poor families).
55 See id. at 732 (discussing the second articulated goal of Learnfare). But see Thomas
Corbett et al., Learnfare: The Wisconsin Experience, 12 FOCUS 1, Fall & Winter 1989, at 7
("[T]he lack of services is evidence that government is not living up to its part of the
,social contract.").
56 1987 WIS. LAWS 27 (1987); see Williams, supra note 47, at 726 (stating that
originally the statute only targeted teens who themselves were parents).
57 Williams, supra note 47, at 726. The Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services limited the nonparent teen population to those living with a natural or adoptive
parent. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 201.195(3)(k) (1990). Subsequent legislation codified this
limitation. 1987 WIS. LAWS 1664.
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children of welfare recipients complete high school and
receive a minimum level of education. 58 Under this program,
a teenager who missed ten unexcused days of school in one
semester was monitored, and thereafter sanctioned if he or
she missed two unexcused days of school in any month. 59
When a student was sanctioned, his or her parent's aid was
reduced by the full amount designated for this child.60 On the
surface, such a program may seem harmless or even
innovative, but in reality this program did nothing more then
penalize already suffering families. As stated by Williams,
for Learnfare to be effective, several assumptions were made:
(1) a mother can control her teenager and force him or her to
attend school; (2) the reasons for truancy originate in the
family setting and are not caused by external forces; and (3) a
teen will be motivated to attend school to prevent their family
from being punished. 61 The execution of the program proved
that these assumptions were in fact false. During the 1989
school year, over 2000 students were sanctioned each month,
costing families $3,080,000 in assistance. 62 Williams cites
data that suggests children of AFDC families missed only
three more days per school year then children of non-AFDC
parents, 63 and studies of the effectiveness of Learnfare
58 See De Noble, supra note 47, at 886-87 (arguing Learnfare's manipulation of
welfare as a way to aid the state's in education and ultimately decrease dependence on
public assistance); see also Williams, supra note 47, at 727 (discussing how acquiring a
minimum level of education was intended to create more productive citizens).
59 See De Noble, supra note 47, at 887-88 (explaining that failure to meet semester
attendance requirements subjects recipient to a monthly attendance requirement of no
more than two absent days); Williams, supra note 47, at 727 (discussing the attendance
requirements of Learnfare).
60 See De Noble, supra note 47, at 888 (discussing the steps involved in the eventual
reduction of benefits including a written notice of the effective date of the sanction, the
reduced or discontinued amount, and the right to a fair hearing); see also Williams, supra
note 47, at 727 (describing how in Wisconsin at the time, for a single mother with two
children, such a sanction would result in a monthly reduction of $77.60).
61 Williams, supra note 47, at 728. A Milwaukee assistant principal was quoted as
saying that sanctioned students "are not going to realize the value of an education by
docking their parents. We've had youngsters brought in here by their Learnfare parents
at 8 o'clock, and at 9 o'clock they're gone. It's in one door and out the other." Kenneth J.
Cooper, Financial Penalties Prove No Easy Solution To Dropout Problem, WASH. POST,
Feb. 16, 1990, at A3 (quoting Robert Griffin, Assistant Principal, North Division High
School).
62 Williams, supra note 47, at 727 (citing State of Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau
90-23, An Evaluation of Learnfare Program Administration, Department of Health and
Social Services 5 (Jul. 1990)).
63 Williams, supra note 47, at 733 (citing Wisconsin Learnfare Program: Hearing
[Vol. 21:3
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showed no positive results.64 In fact, one Milwaukee study
even suggested that Learnfare increased, rather then
decreased, school absences. 65
Williams discusses similar reactions and results with the
Family Cap program. 66 Family Cap is a somewhat similar
program to Learnfare that varies from state to state, but
essentially denies benefits for additional children of a mother
who is already receiving assistance. 67 Family Cap relies on
the assumption that welfare mothers purposely have
additional children to receive more assistance. 68 Although the
numbers vary by state, in Illinois the difference in aid for a
two-child family as opposed to a three-child family is a little
more than $100 per month 69, an amount that can hardly be
argued as an incentive to have another child. This small
increase in benefits does not reward families, but enables
them to live arguably, at the basic subsistence levels
necessary for survival. 70 In May 2002, there were over 12,000
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990) (testimony of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant
Secretary for Family Support, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)).
64 See Williams, supra note 47, at 735 (citing a study conducted by ETI, stating that
Learnfare did not show improvement in student attendance); see also John Pawasarat et
al., Evaluation of the Impact of Wisconsin's Learnfare Experiment on the School
Attendance of Teenagers Receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (Feb. 1992),
http://www.uwm.eduIDept/ETI/pages/surveys/each/learn292.htm (finding that Learnfare
program did not improve school attendance, reduce semester absences, or improve
graduation rates, and number of students missing at least one day of school per week
increased during Learnfare program).
65 See Williams, supra note 47, at 735 (citing such findings to Milwaukee study); see
also De Noble, supra note 47, at 899 (discussing the lack of proof that the sanctions of
Learnfare actually improve school attendance).
66 See Williams, supra note 47, at 736 (stating Family Cap, like Learnfare was based
on faulty assumptions about the choices made by the poor).
67 See Williams, supra note 47, at 736 (describing Family Cap as program intended to
influence poor women's decisions on procreation); see also Sargent Shriver National
Center on Poverty Law, End the Family Cap (Nov. 21, 2002), http://www.povertylaw.
org/news.and-eventswoman.view/2002
11_21 [hereinafter End the Family Cap] (discussing Family Cap program, also called the
child exclusion law).
68 See End the Family Cap, supra note 67 (discussing the "myth" that welfare
mothers have more children to receive additional benefits); see also Williams, supra note
47, at 720-21 (explaining how welfare programs were designed with intention of
influencing poor families to adapt to middle-class values).
69 End the Family Cap, supra note 67. A family with two children receives a monthly
benefit of $292 per month. A family with three children receives a monthly benefit of $396
per month. An increase of $104 for having an additional child. Id.
70 See Williams, supra note 47, at 740 (discussing how incremental increase receives
barely covers such basic essentials as diapers, clothing, bottles and formula); End the
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children who were denied assistance in Illinois because of Family
Cap.71 These children were being punished based solely on the
fact that they were conceived, and these families fell deeper into
poverty because of this additional child.72
Behavior modification programs eventually lost their luster
and fell into the backdrop of political discourse. However,
marriage initiative programs seem to be the new generation
of behavior modification programs that promote moral
stigmatization and false assumptions about the poor.
Through TANF marriage promotion programs we see a
rebirth of policy makers relying on faulty assumptions about
the reality of living poor and the ways to correct this "deviant
propensity." 73 TANF assumes that a mother can or should
marry the father of her children. 74 TANF also assumes that if
this mother marries her child's father then she will no longer
rely on public assistance. 75 These assumptions ignore the
reality that a poor mother faces. First, she may not be able to
marry her child's father, for any number of reasons. 76 Second,
Family Cap, supra note 67 (arguing small increase of benefits from having three instead
of two children is not a "reward," but sufficient to maintain only basic levels of living).
71 End the Family Cap, supra note 67. 12,435 children were denied assistance
because of the Family Cap program. Id.
72 A family with a newborn that is denied assistance falls deeper into poverty.
According to the Family Cap program, if a child is born outside of the ten month period
after the initial application for assistance, the family is not eligible for additional
assistance. End the Family Cap, supra note 67.
73 See Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Symposium, Welfare Reform
Ends in 2002: What's Ahead for Low-Income and No-Income Families? Welfare Reform
and Families in the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REV. 386, 399-400 (2002) (writing
that welfare programs "carry clear assumptions about the morality and motivations of
welfare recipients" which reinforce the notion that welfare recipients are the cause of
social problems); Williams, supra note 47, at 727 (discussing how behavior modification
programs emanate from the myth that social problems are caused by the deviant behavior
of welfare recipients).
74 See Pro-marriage Initiative Holds Promise for Poor, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at
12A (writing that new welfare proposals are aimed at promoting marriage among low-
income individuals). But see Reich, supra note 46 (reasoning that lack of education is the
main reason for poverty and marriage is not the solution as the poverty problem would
perpetuate if a mother were to marry a man with a low-income job).
75 See Reich, supra note 46 (arguing that low-income mothers who marry, often marry
low-income men, making it less likely that they will stop relying on public assistance). But
see Ronald K. Fitten, Surprises in Welfare Study - Many Women Get Off Aid Within Two
Years - And Stay Off, SEATTLE TIMES, July 9, 1991, at El (proposing that education and
better job opportunities are more effective solutions than marriage in helping low-income
families get off public assistance).
76 See Edin, supra note 38 (listing many reasons why low-income mothers do not
remarry such as the desire for economic stability, the wish for respectability (and how
marriage to low-income men will not achieve that), the distrust of low-income men in
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even if marriage is an option, this does not guarantee that
this man will be able to support her or her family. 77 Third,
and perhaps most importantly, marriage is a choice, and the
choice not to marry is her prerogative, whatever the reason
may be.78 State sanctioned marriage promotion overlooks the
social truths that a poverty stricken mother faces on a day to
day basis. 79
IV. THE HEALTHY MARRIAGES INITIATIVE
Although TANF was passed in 1996, many states did not
implement marriage promotion programs until the Bush
Administration introduced the "Healthy Marriages Initiative"
in 2002.80 The stated goal of the "Healthy Marriages
Initiative" is to "help couples who choose marriage for
themselves develop the skills and knowledge necessary to
form and sustain healthy marriages."81 The Administration is
using TANF as a vehicle for their plan of promoting marriage
and therefore stability and independence in low income
their ability to handle money, raise children, and remain faithful, and the enjoyment of
economic independence); see also Roger Worthington, Governor Proposes to Reward
Marriage, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 1991, at 25 (arguing that welfare programs can push
young, low-income mothers into marriages they do not want because of abusive or
irresponsible husbands).
77 See Edin, supra note 38 (writing that the men in the lives of low-income mothers
often hold unstable employment and offer varying financial contributions to the family);
see also Reich, supra note 46 (stating that because a less stable job market has made it
difficult for low-income men, "if the mother is living and sharing expenses with a working
man who's also at the bottom of the income ladder, they're still likely to be poor.").
78 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides the right "to marry, or not marry"); see also Cara C. Orr, Comment,
Married to a Myth: How Welfare Reform Violates the Constitutional Rights of Poor Single
Mothers, 34 Cap. U.L. REV. 211, 214 (2005) (stating that the right to not marry has been
recognized by the Supreme Court as being protected under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
79 See Edin, supra note 38 (arguing that women living in poverty have to make hard
choices to support and protect their children, one of these choices being the choice not to
marry and create an unstable living environment); see also Orr, supra note 78, at 226,
236-37 (writing that low-income mothers face social, political, and economic inequalities
such as gender bias and lower incomes).
80 See NPC, supra note 42, at 12. The Healthy Marriages Initiative allocated funds to
promote marriage. See generally CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, REVISED SIDE-
BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF FAMILY FORMATION PROVISIONS IN TANF REAUTHORIZATION
LEGISLATION (2002), http://clasp.org/publications/6-5-O2tanf3.pdf [hereinafter SIDE-BY-
SIDE COMPARISON].
81 See NPC, supra note 42, at 12.
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communities.8 2 The reauthorization of TANF is still pending
in both houses of Congress, but proposals include a detailed
marriage promotion program using advertising campaigns,
high school classes on the importance of marriage, pre- and
post-marital conflict management programs, and divorce
reduction programs, among others, all using TANF funds to
promote these goals.8 3 Under the current law, "TANF funds
may be used to support these activities but there is no dedicated
funding stream."8 4
V. STATE SPECIFIC ATTEMPTS AT MARRIAGE PROMOTION
In addition to this pending legislation, some states have
implemented programs of their own that aim to promote
marriage in accordance with the Healthy Marriage
Initiative.8 5 Perhaps the most extensive is in Oklahoma,
where the state officials have created the Oklahoma Marriage
Initiative.8 6  This program includes creating a marriage
resource center, community based workshops sponsored by
82 The argument being marriage provides for stability, wealth, and an overall
healthier environment for children. Roundtable Resources on the Healthy Marriage
Initiative, The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy (June 30, 2004),
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org
/news/article.cfm?id=1668.
83 Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2005, H.R. 240, 109th
Cong. § 103 (2005). See generally SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON, supra note 80 (proposing
$100 million grant program to promote healthy marriage through public advertising
campaigns, high school education marriage programs, marriage education and skills
development, pre-marital education programs, marriage enhancement skills training,
divorce reduction programs, and marriage mentoring programs).
84 SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON, supra note 80, at 3.
85 See DEBORAH A. ORTH & MALCOLM L. GOGGIN, How STATES AND COUNTIES HAVE
RESPONDED TO THE FAMILY POLICY GOALS OF WELFARE REFORM 7-10 (2003),
http://www.rockinst.org/publications/federalism/ACFFinall203.pdf (summarizing how
states such as Oklahoma, Michigan, and Arizona are using TANF money to fund
marriage promotion programs); see also National Conference of State Legislatures,
Strengthening Marriage and Two-Parent Families (2002), http://www.ncsl.
org/statefedlwelfare/strength.htm#funds [hereinafter NCSL] (comparing the different
marriage promotion programs enacted by states); Frontline: Let's Get Married, (PBS
television broadcast Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
marriage/etc/script.html (explaining how Welfare requirement recipient attended
"relationship training" along with required TANF work training).
86 See generally The Oklahoma Marriage Initiative, http://www.okmarriage.org (last
visited Oct. 9, 2006); see also ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 42 n.12 ("Oklahoma is
distinctive because of the extraordinary efforts the state has made to promote marriage
and strengthen two-parent families."); NCSL, supra note 85 (outlining the main
components of Oklahoma's Marriage Initiative).
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PREP87 hosted in community centers and schools throughout
Oklahoma, and youth outreach programs, among other
agendas. 88  The PREP workshops are offered to TANF
recipients as well as non-TANF recipients 89 to learn marriage
skills, discourage pre-marital births, and dissuade divorce. 90
Oklahoma has designated $10 million in TANF funds for
these programs, 1.8 million of which had already been spent
as of 2002 on PREP classes and other preliminary work. 91
Furthermore, Oklahoma has amended its TANF statute to
reflect the policy-preference for a couple to be married by
calculating aid amounts differently for a couple who is
cohabitating, as opposed to a couple who has chosen to
marry. 92 Through this program, Oklahoma has affirmatively
chosen to give preferential treatment to two-parent families
in factually similar situations based solely on marital status.
In Arizona, officials have allocated over $1 million to fund
their Marriage Initiative program.93 This program funds
87 See generally PREP Inc. Divorce Prevention and Marriage Enhancement Program,
http://www.prepinc.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). PREP is a series of educational
workshops aimed at encouraging marriage and discouraging divorce.
88 See generally The Oklahoma Marriage Initiative, supra note 86 (explaining
Oklahoma Marriage Initiative); see also NCSL, supra note 85 (describing the Oklahoma
Marriage Initiative program).
89 See Oklahoma Marriage Initiative Marriage Education and Workshops,
http://www.okmarriage.org/Services/MarriageEducationWorkshops.asp (last visited Oct.
20, 2006) (describing the PREP workshops are "free to anyone who wishes to attend"); see
also ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 11 (stating that twenty to twenty-five percent of
the enrollees were TANF clients).
90 See generally PREP Inc. Divorce Prevention and Marriage Enhancement Program,
http://www.prepinc.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (giving an overview of the PREP
program); see also ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 9 (discussing how PREP was based
certain risk factors found to lead to divorce and those that strengthen marital
relationships).
91 See NCSL, supra note 85 (stating that Oklahoma has used $10 million of TANF
funds, with $1.8 million already spent); see also ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 16
(stating that in March of 2000 Governor Keating set aside $10 million to fund Oklahoma
Marriage Initiative).
92 See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:10-3-57(f) (2006). The statute states (in reference to
a cohabitating partner of the TANF recipient): 'The income of this individual(s) is
computed the same as stepparent income; however, the exemption of one-half of the
remainder and dependent care expense is not applicable in determining this individual's
countable earned income." This is an income-based incentive for married TANF recipients
by allowing them to disregard the additional income. ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at
13.
93 See NCSL, supra note 85 (stating that Arizona has spent $1,150,000 in TANF
funding for their Marriage Initiative); see also ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 16
(stating that Arizona allocated over $1 million of TANF funds for programs to form and
maintain two-parent families and promote marriage).
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marriage skills workshops in community centers and also the
production of "healthy marriage" handbooks that are
distributed to couples who apply for a marriage license. 94
Utah has allocated $600,000 of TANF funds towards the
Governor's Commission on Marriage. 95 This program hosts
yearly conferences on marriage issues, has implemented high
school civics classes focusing on marriage, and developed an
informational video for couples anticipating marriage. 96
In Michigan, officials have enacted the Encouraging Family
Formation pilot program. 97 This program uses TANF funds to
create a family formation and fathering curriculum to
promote marriage and responsible parenting across the
state.98 West Virginia set aside $12.8 million to pay for a pilot
program that granted an extra $100 credit per month to
married couples receiving TANF funds while the couple
remained married. 99
What all these programs have in common is that they have
been created as a response to the passage of TANF, and thus
use TANF money for funding. Most of these programs are
experimental and there is insufficient data to determine their
94 See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Article, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future
of Marriage in the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1, 65 (2003); NCSL, supra note 85. Arizona has
spent $75,000 for vouchers and $75,000 for the printing and production of marriage
handbooks. Id.
95 NCSL, supra note 85 (stating that Utah has spent $600,000 in TANF funding
towards their Governor's Commission on Marriage).
96 See ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 7. Utah's program hosts marriage
workshops and conferences, as well as distributing educational tapes on marriage-related
issues to couples applying for marriage licenses. See generally Utah Marriage,
http://utahmarriage.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
97 See NCSL, supra note 85 (stating that Michigan instituted the Encouraging Family
Formation pilot program using TANF funds to create family units and improve parenting
and communication skills); see also ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85, at 15 (characterizing
Encouraging Family Formation as having similar purposes to PREP).
98 See ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85 (describing the twin aims of Encouraging
Family Formation program as elevating role of fathers in life of family when a child is
born and preventing non-marital births when there is already a child out of wedlock); see
also NCSL, supra note 85 (showing that Michigan set aside $400,000 for these programs
for the 2002 fiscal year and additional $250,000 has been appropriated for 2003 in
addition to the remaining unused portion of the 2002 grant).
99 See NCSL, supra note 85; Cheryl Wetzstein, Welfare Promotes Marriage; Education
Courses up for Renewal Aim to Stabilize Families, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A01.
The $12.8 million was intended to give 128,497 married couples an extra $100 a month in
their welfare checks, as a "reward" for staying together. Id. While this program has since
been discontinued, the bonus was awarded to 4496 families from the period of January
1997 through June 2000. NCLS, supra note 85.
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effectiveness;100 however, initial findings suggest that there
has been no noticeable rise in healthy marriage statistics.101
Perhaps the most relevant study as to the effects of TANF on
marriage is from the Fragile Families and Child Well Being
Study.102 The study was conducted in the late 1990s and
followed 4700 couples during the birth of their children, most
of whom were unmarried at the time of the study. 103 The
study explores how low-income families are presented with
different challenges than those of couples from middle class
backgrounds.O4 More then two-fifths of the couples from low-
income communities had children from other relationships,
making these couples immersed in complex family structures
that lead to additional stress and depletion of resources.1 05
Additionally, this study indicates that women are less likely
to marry a man when there are children present from his
other relationships.106 The Fragile Families Study suggests
100 DAVID FEIN ET AL., WELFARE REFORM AND FAMILY FORMATION PROJECT,
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS 2 (2002), http://www.abtassociates.com
/attachments/wrffproject.pdf [hereinafter ASSESSING] (discussing the lack of evidence of
whether or not TANF programs have actually influenced family formation); see NPC,
supra note 42, at 22 (outlining the challenges to evaluating marriage initiative programs
due to the fact that marriage education programs have not systematically targeted the
low-income population, and any program evaluations have not used large samples).
101 See ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 5 (stating that of the minimal evidence as to
how welfare reforms actually affect attitudes towards marriage, little if no impact has
been found, the reforms most likely to affect marriage being the ones that directly
influence welfare benefits); see also NPC, supra note 42, at 23 (suggesting the possibility
of small increase in number of couples who marry as a result of participating in marriage
initiative programs).
102 The Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study, http://www.fragilefamilies.
princeton.edulabout.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
103 See NPC, supra note 42, at 17.
104 See Kathleen Mullan Harris et al., New Frontiers in Poverty Research and Policy:
A Summit on Poverty University of North Carolina Center on Poverty, Work and
Opportunity: Family Structure, Poverty and Family Well-Being, 10 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY.
POL'Y J. 45, 59-60 (discussing how "fragile families" data suggests that serious behavioral
problems such as infidelity, criminal behavior, and domestic violence prevent many of
these unmarried couples from ever getting married); see also NPC, supra note 42, at 17
(stating that circumstances for low-income parents may pose special challenges to
promoting marriage due to the existence of complex family relationships between several
households).
105 See NPC, supra note 42, at 17 (specifying the challenges low-income parents face
due to relationships among individuals in several different households). See generally
MARCIA J. CARLSON, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING WORKING PAPER #2006-
28-FF, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MULTI-PARTNERED FERTILITY FOR PARENTAL
INVOLVEMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS (2006) http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapersWP06-
28-FF.pdf (discussing large number of "multi-partnered fertility" couples today which has
increased family complexity by creating challenges on how to manage parental roles).
106 See NPC, supra note 42, at 17 (explaining the presence of children from other
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that marriage promotion in low-income families may not be
the most efficient use of resources because of complex familial
factors that influence decision-making. 107
Additionally, programs such as PREP are not specifically
designed to promote marriage per se.10 PREP is a program
that was designed in a university setting for middle class
couples to engage in pre-marital and post-marital counseling
to help prepare for marriage and maintain a healthy
relationship after the marriage commitment has been
made.109 In fact, the developers of PREP have stated that
"PREP is effective at weeding out couples before marriage but
has never been shown to encourage marriage.... Marriage
education can empower those who choose marriage for
themselves to improve their odds."1l0 Programs such as PREP
have a valid place in our social framework, but these types of
programs do not pretend to be a method to encourage marriage
among the poor."'
relationships reduces the likelihood of marriage); see also CARLSON, supra note 105, at 8
(stating that couples are less likely to cohabit or marry after having a child if the father,
not the mother, already has children by a previous partner).
107 See Pamela Smock & Stephanie Coontz, Marriage Preparation Prescriptions for
Welfare Reform and Poverty Reduction: Take with a Couple of Grains of Salt, available at
http://listserv.uh.edu
/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0212&L=ccf&T =0&P=2375 (last visited Oct. 21, 2006) (stating there is
no evidence that programs such as PREP are effective for low-income families and that
those on welfare have many other issues to deal with besides marital conflict ); see also
NPC, supra note 42, at 18 (commenting "that low-income couples face different or more
complex issues that need to be addressed within marriage promotion programs.").
108 See Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 ("[T]here is confusion between the goal of
preparing people for marriage and promoting marriage among low-income people. The
Heritage Report takes several programs and interventions designed to improve
relationship quality, and ultimately to deter divorce, among already married couples as
evidence that such programs could get low-income couples to marry. In fact, however, the
main program discussed in the report [PREP] that does target unmarried couples does not
aim to encourage marriage."); see also NPC, supra note 42, at 15 (listing purposes and
effect of PREP).
109 See Helen Alvar6, Saying Yes Before Saying "I Do" Premarital Sex and
Cohabitation as a Piece of the Divorce Puzzle, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 7,
39 (2004) (observing that PREP helps engaged, just married, and long married couples
with their relationships); see also NPC, supra note 42, at 18 (noting PREP was designed
for engaged or married middle-class couples).
110 Smock & Coontz, supra note 107.
111 See Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 (mentioning that PREP does not promote
marriage); see also NPC, supra note 42, at 18 (clarifying that PREP was developed for
middle class couples that were already engaged or married).
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David Fein discusses some early studies of state programs
implemented to achieve the goals set forth in TANF.112 Fein
asks questions such as, what effects do marriage promotion
goals have on welfare recipients and how do these goals affect
the psyche of a welfare recipient?113 There is no answer to
these questions just yet, but simple surveys of women
receiving welfare suggest that the choice not to marry is
largely because of external factors, rather then a
predisposition to deviant behavior. 114  Fein's research
suggests that while marriage promotion programs may make
marriage seem like a more attractive option for single women,
it does nothing to address the reasons why these women
choose not to marry.115 Coincidentally, these are some of the
same reasons why single women find themselves in the dire
situations poverty creates; lack of jobs, resources, and
adequate housing. 116
Marriage initiatives, like the ones in Oklahoma or West
Virginia, affirmatively discriminate against one couple
because of the choice not to marry.117  Marriage is a
constitutionally protected choice, with some caveats. 118 The
112 ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 5 (discussing Delaware's ABC program which
imposed financial incentives and penalties to range of work and parenting requirements,
Florida's Family Transitions Program and Connecticut's Jobs First Program, both of
which offered only incentives, Fein takes look at preliminary research of effectiveness of
these programs in marriage rates among welfare families, considering their thoughts
concerning marriage before initiative passed).
113 Id. at 2 (examining how state TANF programs, which promote two-parent
families, change attitudes associated with marriage).
114 See Edin, supra note 38 (stating women are not willing to marry financially
unstable partners because of risk such choice would place on their children); see also
Editorial, supra note 46, at A14 (suggesting that in while poor woman desire marriage,
they lack access to mature and responsible mates, which is the true cause for their
eventual decision not to marry).
115 See ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 5 (suggesting that poverty has little to do with
desire to be married, but everything to do with reality of that choice).
116 See ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 5 (pointing to education statistics as a measure
of marriage behavior); see also Athena Mutua, Why Retire the Feminization of Poverty
Construct?, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2001) (discussing that women's poverty was
due to low-paying jobs, single parenthood ,and inadequate government benefits).
117 See NCSL, supra note 85 (highlighting money that West Virginia gives to two-
parent families for every month they remain married and services that Oklahoma gives to
married couples); see, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:10-3-57(f)(3) (stating in reference to
cohabitating partner of TANF recipient that "[t]he income of this individual(s) is
computed the same as stepparent income; however, the exemption of one-half of the
remainder and dependent care expense is not applicable in determining this individual's
countable earned income").
118 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (stating "decision to marry is a
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choice to marry is one that is fundamental to the individual,
and state intervention into this area must not unduly
infringe upon this right.ii 9 In cases surrounding a person's
right to privacy within marriage, the Court has applied a
strict scrutiny test to determine the validity of governmental
intrusion.120 Marriage promotion programs intrude upon the
personal decision-making processes of TANF families because
they use penalties and incentives to manipulate a family's
basic means of subsistence to encourage behavior that the
state believes is most advantageous for society.121 These
programs claim to offer a better alternative, but in reality are
attempts to coerce couples into marriage, a decision that may
not be financially feasible or emotionally beneficial to the
family.122
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR TANF RECIPIENTS
A. Entitlements
Historically, financial assistance to needy families was
considered an entitlement. Entitlement status was a
revolutionary concept introduced by Charles Reich in 1964,
and adopted by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly. 23 In
fundamental right"). But see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (declaring
marriage fundamental right protected by Constitution but not yet declaring this right
universal to include same-sex marriage).
119 See Turner, 482 U.S. 78 at 95 (announcing that right to marry is fundamental
right); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (stating that liberty in Constitution includes individual's
right to marry).
120 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (commenting that marriage
regulations that significantly interfere with marital relationship are subject to rigorous
scrutiny); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965) (stating "the Connecticut
anti-use statute invades a protected area of privacy and association or that it demeans the
marriage relationship. The nature of the right invaded is pertinent, to be sure, for
statutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under the cases of this Court, require
strict scrutiny") (White, J., concurring).
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2)-(4) (2006) (listing the state-encouraged behaviors of
marriage, prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and two-parent families); see
also NCSL, supra note 85 (listing the benefits that married couples receive from state
marriage promotion programs).
122 See Edin, supra note 38 (highlighting such reasons to not get married as
affordability, respectability, trust, and control); see also ENDABUSE, supra note 27 (noting
that marriage "does not guarantee greater economic security").
123 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (stating welfare benefits are
matter of entitlement); see also Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
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this landmark case, the Court cites Reich's language and
refers to welfare benefits as a "matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."124 This
was a perceptible shift in poverty law jurisprudence. The
acknowledgment by the Court that welfare was a right that
could not be suspended without due process of the law
originated in this case. 125 This decision affirmed a welfare
recipient's right to be heard. It affirmed the right to
challenge arbitrary reduction or cancellation of benefits that
a citizen is entitled to.126 This innovative approach to welfare
policy set the stage for the evolution of social and political
attitudes concerning poverty for the next thirty years.
However, in 1996, with the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
Congress explicitly eliminated the entitlement status of
welfare.127 Although entitlement was never a constitutional
concept, it suggested a stronger relationship of accountability
between the government and the recipient, a relationship
which some argue has now become distorted.128
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L. J. 1245, 1255 (1965) (discussing the irony that
while society recognizes the "entitlement" many in society have to monetary sources of
security, "it is only the poor whose entitlements.., that have not been effectively
enforced").
124 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
125 Id. at 264. The Court asserts:
"[W]hen welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the
recipient with procedural due process. For qualified recipients, welfare provides the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. Thus the crucial
factor in this context ... is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately
desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn,
adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy." (internal
citations omitted).
Id.
126 Id. at 265 (arguing that the governmental interests that require welfare, also
require its "uninterrupted provision").
127 42 USC § 601(b) (2006). "No individual entitlement. This part.., shall not be
interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program
funded under this part ......
128 See Janice Peterson, Feminist Perspectives on TANF Reauthorization: An
Introduction to Key Issues for the Future of Welfare Reform, Institute for Women's Policy
Research Briefing Paper (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdfle5l1.html#keyl
("In many ways, the most radical change associated with the 1996 legislation is the
elimination of the individual entitlement to cash public assistance. Under the [Aid to
Families with Dependent Children] program, states were required to aid all families
eligible under state income standards; this is no longer the case. It is now left up to the
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Traditionally, welfare recipients have been granted some
scope of constitutional protection. A few cases of note are
N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,i29 King v. Smith,130 Moore
v. City of East Cleveland,i31 and Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l.132  Each of these cases served an important
constitutional role in creating a barrier of protection that
welfare recipients are entitled to despite their subservient
role to the government.
B. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution has been
interpreted to grant rights to all citizens that may not be
abridged by any law made by state or federal governments.i 33
In Cahill, the Court discussed the rights of illegitimate
children and the validity of laws passed to penalize the
parents and the children of these parents who were born out-
of-wedlock.134 Specifically, the New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization challenged the constitutionality of programs
that limited or denied benefits to children based on the
marital status of their parents. 35 The Court agreed that such
a program was not constitutionally valid because the crux of
states to determine when and under what conditions they will provide cash public
assistance to poor families. While the federal law prohibits states from using TANF funds
to assist certain categories of individuals or families, there is no requirement that a state
provide assistance to any individual or family."); see also Cossman, supra note 11, at 454
(arguing that "[t]he paternity provisions [of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act] do not expressly promote marriage. Rather, they are
intended to make women 'appropriately' dependent on the biological fathers of their
children, whether married or not, rather than the state.").
129 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
130 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
131 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
132 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
133 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) for an
example of a case describing the rights under the Equal Protection Clause as
"inalienable."
134 Cahill, 411 U.S. at 620 (arguing that because children are not responsible for
their own birth, imposing punishments on that illegitimate child is "ineffectual" and
"unjust" way of deterring parents).
135 Id. at 619 (challenging part of assistance program that only gave benefits to
families of households composed of heterosexual married couples with a natural child of
both, natural child of one adopted by the other, or adopted child by both).
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the analysis was based upon the marital status of the
parents, not the need of the children. 136
Similarly, in King v. Smith, the Court struck down a state
regulation which denied assistance to children if their mother
was cohabitating with any "able-bodied" man.137  These
supposed "substitute father" regulations were meant to
discover if a woman was defrauding the system by accepting
welfare assistance while living with a man who was
supporting her.138 Under the Alabama regulation, a man
qualified as a "substitute father" if he lived in the home with
the child's mother, if he visited the home frequently for the
purpose of "cohabitating" with the child's mother, or if he did
not frequent the home but "cohabited" with the mother
elsewhere.139 These regulations made no determination about
the income or responsibilities of the "substitute father."140
The Court found no legitimate state interest in this policy,141
and further stated that this policy ignored the reality of the
situation, that the "substitute father" had no legal obligation
to the children, therefore his existence could not be leveraged
as punishment against children eligible for aid.142
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland143, the Court invalidated
a city ordinance that attempted to define what constitutes a
family for the purpose of limiting occupancy of dwelling to
136 Id. at 621 (holding that there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for
denying an essential right to a child simply because the child is illegitimate).
137 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (holding Alabama's substitute father
regulation invalid because it defines "parent" in a manner inconsistent with Section 406
of the Social Security Act).
138 Id. at 311 (explaining how Alabama's "substitute-father" regulation denied
assistance to children of a mother who "cohabits" with any single or married "able-bodied"
man).
139 Id. at 313-14 (citing to Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance,
pt. I, c. 11, s. VI).
140 Id. at 315-16. (explaining how in this case the alleged "substitute father" had nine
children of his own, lived with his wife, was not the father of any of the mother-in-
question's children and thus was not legally obligated under Alabama law to support any
of them).
141 Id. at 320 (holding that Alabama's interests in discouraging immorality and
illegitimacy are not legitimate justifications for AFDC disqualification).
142 Id. at 327 (explaining that children of fathers living in the home are in a much
different situation than children of mothers who cohabit with a men the state considered
"substitute fathers" in that these "substitute fathers" have no legal duty to support the
unrelated children).
143 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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members of a narrowly defined family.144 This ordinance
limited the definition of family to include only certain
familial relationships including husband, wife, and
children. 145 Under this ordinance, the plaintiff had committed
a crime by allowing her two grandsons, who were first
cousins, to reside in her home.146 The Court invalidated the
ordinance as an intrusive regulation of the family147, stating
that "[tihis Court has long recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by [the Constitution]."148
The importance of these cases is that state governments do
not have the authority to dictate the moral or personal
decisions of their citizens when it comes to marriage and
family matters. 149 This protection of fundamental privacy
rights includes welfare recipients.150 States are not granted
power to interfere with personal decision-making solely based
upon a person's status as a welfare recipient.151 States do,
however, have the authority to construct independent welfare
144 Id. at 495-500 (holding Cleveland's housing ordinance invalid because of its
failure to alleviate those conditions the City set out to resolve).
145 Id. at 496 n.2 (citing to Housing Code of City of E. Cleveland § 1341.08 (1966)).
146 Id. at 496-97. Mrs. Moore was living in her home with her son, Dale, and two
grandsons, Dale Jr. and John Moore. It is unclear whether her son was living in the home
at the time of the citation, but it is implied that if he was, she would have received a
second citation. The ordinance recognizes as a "family" only a few categories of related
individuals, none of which fit the household in question. Upon conviction, Mrs. Moore was
sentenced to five days in jail and a twenty-five dollar fine. Id.
147 Id. at 498-99 (holding that ordinance "selects certain categories of relatives who
may live together and declares that others may not," which is an invalid government
intrusion on choices concerning family living arrangements).
148 Id. at 499.
149 See id. (stating that freedom of personal choice in family matters and marriage
are protected from intrusive regulation by the state); N.J Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619, 619, 621 (1973) (reversing decision that upheld program which limited
benefits to "only those otherwise qualified families 'which consist of a household composed
of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least one
minor child... of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child
adopted by both," saying it discriminated against illegitimate children).
150 See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1014 (D.N.J. 1995) (stating that it is "well-
settled that decisions about family composition, conception and childbirth fall into a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy); see also Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794
(11th Cir. 1987) (stating substantive due process rights are fundamental rights, such as
privacy and marriage, which a state cannot take away).
151 See Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1014 (noting that a state may not hinder one's
exercise of protected choices, such as family composition); Valley Family Planning v. N.D.,
489 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D.N.D. 1980) (discussing that recipient of governmental benefits
may not be required to surrender constitutional right in order to obtain a benefit).
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programs, but these programs must exist within certain
federal and constitutional guidelines available to all citizens
through the Equal Protection Clause.152 Marriage promotion
programs are subject to these same requirements153 States
must take care to not infringe on the personal decision-
making of individuals, welfare recipient or not. 154 Statutes
that grant incentives or enforce penalties because of the
choice to marry or not marry must be strictly construed to
promote a legitimate governmental interest. 155 A citizen's
right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and state interference must be
careful not to infringe upon this right.156 Marriage promotion
programs are yet to be challenged from this angle, but this
may be more a reflection of a lack of resources by the affected
class, diminutive state participation in the initiative, or other
external factors, rather than an acceptance of the legitimacy
of the initiative.157
152 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (noting that states have
the power to constitute their social policy but, in areas of social welfare, the state must
have legitimate state interest for their regulation); Rodriguez v. United States, 983 F.
Supp. 1445, 1458 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (discussing necessary connection between state
regulation and legitimate governmental purpose).
153 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting higher
standard of review for state laws which interfere with personal rights protected by
Constitution); see also Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing heightened standard of scrutiny for regulations which burden exercise of
fundamental rights independently protected against governmental interference).
154 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (finding that freedom of personal choice in marriage
and family matters are protected from intrusive regulation by the state); Cahill, 411 U.S.
at 621 (reversing decision that upheld program which limited benefits to children of
married parents while discriminating against children of parents who were not married);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968) (striking down state regulation which denied
assistance to children who's mother was cohabitating with any "able-bodied" man).
155 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (discussing that laws which impinge on
constitutionally protected personal rights are subject to strict scrutiny); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978) (noting that strict scrutiny is required in analyzing
under Equal Protection Clause when classification created by statute infringes "upon a
fundamental right," such as right to marry).
156 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.") (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)); see also Valley Family
Planning, 489 F. Supp. at 242 (stating indirect "inhibition or deterrence of the exercise of
a constitutional right is as odious as the direct prohibition of the exercise of that right.").
157 See Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (noting that courts
continually reject states' intrusive regulation of the family); see also Hearing on Welfare
Reform Reauthorization Proposals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Lisalyn R.
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C. Right to Privacy
Right to privacy actions have a detailed history in
constitutional law jurisprudence. Perhaps the most relevant
case for this inquiry is Griswold v. Connecticut.158 While
Griswold does not directly address the issue of marriage, it
does discuss the rights of married couples to engage in
private decision-making processes free from government
intrusion.159 The Court discusses the idea of a "zone of
privacy" that emanates from numerous amendments in the
Constitution.160 Justice Douglas states "[w]e deal with a right
of privacy older than the Bill of Rights... Marriage is...
intimate to the degree of being sacred. [This union promotes]
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects."161
The Court has also found a right to privacy in the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 162 The Court
has stated in Roe v. Wade163 that although "[tlhe Constitution
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy ... the Court
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution."164 The right to privacy includes the
Jacobs, Vice President for Government Relations, Legal Momentum (formerly NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund)), available at http://waysandmeans.house.govthearings.
asp?formmode=view&id=2996#Jacobs (discussing overwhelming poverty among children
and mothers in single parent households; that states are allowed, but not required, to use
funds for marriage promotion programs; and that nearly eight in ten Americans want the
government to stay out of personal decisions about when and whether to marry).
158 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
159 Id. at 486 (noting that marriage is sacred and contained in a right to privacy older
than the Bill of Rights).
160 Id. at 483-85 (discussing First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments
respectively, defining how each amendment creates a zone of privacy, which connect to
create a constitutionally protected right to privacy).
161 Id. at 486.
162 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (discussing personal rights of
privacy which are fundamental in the concept of liberty, guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 n.1, 487 (noting that Supreme Court has
never held that "Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights
that the Constitution specifically mentions by name," and that "Due Process Clause
protects liberties which are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental"' marriage being one of those fundamental rights (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
163 410 U.S. 113.
164 Id. at 152.
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right of marriage. 165 The Court recognizes marriage as part of
a fundamental right to privacy protected by the Constitution
and thus deserving of the highest level of Constitutional
safeguard from governmental intrusion. 166
In a subsequent case, the Court extended the rights of
personal decision-making (concerning contraception) to
unmarried couples. In Eisenstadt v Baird167, the Court
stated "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."168 Although this case does not directly
deal with the right to marry, the right to privacy and
decision-making within that right is presumably a protected
area. 169 There is a justifiable argument that government
regulation, be it incentives or penalties, within the realm of
the right to privacy, must be strictly construed to promote a
legitimate purpose. 170  The government has a legitimate
interest in regulating some aspects of contraception, but the
Court has determined that this right is not absolute. 171 The
165 Id. (listing marriage and family relationships as examples of rights included in
the guarantee of personal privacy); see Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(discussing matters and family life as one of the 'liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (noting that marriage
is right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights).
166 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment protection of rights
that are so rooted in tradition as to be ranked fundamental, and should be safeguarded
from impairment by the States); see Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir.
1987) (noting marriage as substantive due process right, incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is held to be so fundamental that a state may not take it
away).
167 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
168 Id. at 453.
169 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1978) ("While the outer
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among
the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference
are personal decisions 'relating to marriage"') (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973)); see generally Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (evaluating right to privacy in
contraception context and holding that one's decision to use contraception is protected by
right to privacy regardless of whether she is married or not).
170 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that strict scrutiny should be applied to all infringements on fundamental rights);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503-04 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that any regulation of
fundamental right must be reviewed under strict scrutiny standard and suggesting that
privacy might be such a right).
171 See generally Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (holding that statute prohibiting various types
of contraceptive sales was unconstitutional intrusion by state on individual decisions
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regulation of contraception must be limited to the
distribution and manufacture of the drug, not to the personal
decision making that is connected to the use of the product. 172
This paper asserts that the same or a similar argument could
be made for the right to privacy regarding marriage. The
government has the right to regulate the mechanics of
marriage, for example, by issuing licenses173, but there is an
infringement on the right to privacy when officials attempt to
coerce individuals to marry, particularly in the case of
economically disadvantaged TANF recipients. 174  TANF
recipients rely on the support they receive from the
government for the basic needs of survival.175 Marriage
promotion programs attempt to coerce TANF recipients to
make "better" decisions in their personal relationships by
threatening financial consequences, the area where welfare
recipients are most vulnerable.176 This type of program is
protected as privacy rights under due process clause of Fourteenth amendment);
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (concluding right of privacy to be free from unwanted intrusions
into fundamental decisions of whether to have children is same for married and
unmarried alike); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding state law prohibiting dispensing
or use of birth control devices to or by married couples violated right of privacy found
implicit in various amendments in bill of rights).
172 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86 ("[T]he constitutionally protected right of privacy
extends to an individual's liberty to make choices regarding contraception [and] does
not.., automatically invalidate every state regulation in this area. The business of
manufacturing and selling contraceptives may be regulated in ways that do not infringe
protected individual choices.").
173 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (positing that the state has an
"absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved."); see also
Kevin A. Smith, Note, For Better or For Worse: State Prohibition on Same-Sex Marriages,
43 WAYNE L. REV. 287 (1996) ('The power to regulate marriage has been held to be a
sovereign function of the states.").
174 See NCSL, supra note 85 (describing marriage promotion programs in various
states); see, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:10-3-57 (2006) (setting up various special
considerations for distribution of TANF funds, some of which give disparate consideration
to unmarried couples and sometimes penalize them economically by withholding welfare
funds).
175 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (noting the grave importance of
welfare assistance and commenting that the "controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits [and] [s]ince he lacks
independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate"); Catholic Charities
USA Urges Greater Flexibility in Restrictive Proposed Federal Welfare Regulations, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 22, 2006 [hereinafter Catholic Charities] (suggesting that welfare
recipients depend on TANF funds for basic needs).
176 See ORTH & GOGGIN, supra note 85 at 13 (illustrating how various states have
responded to federal welfare policy goal of promoting marriage through "financial rewards
and penalties"); see also PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, UPDATE ON
THE MARRIAGE AND FATHERHOOD PROVISIONS OF THE 2006 FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE
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contrary to the American sense of freedom and justice
because it attempts to interfere with personal decision
making processes that all Americans are constitutionally
entitled to.177 At the core of the American concept of freedom
is the right to make decisions concerning personal matters
without the interference of the government. This right is the
crux of the constitutional right to privacy. 178
Any regulation of a fundamental right passed by the
legislature is subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. 179 To
withstand this scrutiny, the government must prove not only
that there is a compelling interest in the regulation, but also
that there is no less restrictive means to attain this
interest. 180 Marriage is a legitimate interest of the state,
promoting social stability and harmony, but programs that
coerce or penalize TANF recipients for the choice not to
marry, are not only discriminatory, but also, do not meet the
least restrictive means test for promoting this interest. 181
2007 BUDGET PROPOSAL 2 (2006), http://www.clasp.org/publications/marriagejfatherhood-
budget2006.pdf (describing healthy marriage promotion activities qualified to receive
federal TANF funding).
177 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, whether married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear a child."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (invalidating state law that criminalized use of contraceptives in violation of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause's fundamental right of privacy within
marriage).
178 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (listing the
Court-recognized personal decisions an individual may make without unjustified
government interference as those relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454 n.10 (stating
"fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy.") (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969)).
179 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that strict scrutiny should be applied to all infringements on fundamental rights);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that any regulation of a
fundamental right must be reviewed under strict scrutiny standard and suggesting that
privacy might be such a right).
180 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing strict scrutiny
standard and what it entails); United States v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(explaining strict scrutiny standard, which requires that a restriction to be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling government interest and that there be no less restrictive
alternative if it is to survive).
181 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581,
582 (1999) (identifying public interest in marriage as child rearing, socializing adults, and
promoting individual happiness); Rector, supra note 30, at 105 (announcing benefits of
marriage that are "beyond reasonable dispute" and suggesting that government policy can
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Non-marriage penalties that are seen in the Oklahoma and
West Virginia legislation are punitive in nature and are not
strictly construed programs to promote an interest in
marriage.1 82 These programs infringe upon an individuals
right to personal autonomy by pressuring single women to
sacrifice their independence. 183
VII. CRITICISMS OF MARRIAGE PROMOTION PROGRAMS
While constitutional challenges are useful to understand
the legal methods of challenging the infringement of rights
marriage coercion represents, as a policy matter, marriage
promotion programs are simply not the most efficient use of
TANF funds. 8 4  Marriage counseling programs could be
beneficial to families that are struggling, but they are not a
sufficient method to alleviate the problems of the poverty
stricken in this country. Marriage promotion programs under
TANF divert funds from traditional programs that provide
positive results, such as education, childcare, and job
training.185 The recent reauthorization of TANF has affirmed
and should promote marriage). But see Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 ("We completely
agree that interventions to help couples manage their relationships with each other and
with their children in a healthy way would be an important addition to the social safety
net in the United States today .... We are concerned, however, that there is a rush to
implement untested, quick fix programs that underestimate the severity of the
populations they hope to serve, and that are being used to justify a diversion of funds
from proven anti-poverty measures such as education, child care assistance, and job
training.").
182 See NCSL, supra note 85 (describing marriage promotion programs in various
states); see, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:10-3-57 (2006) (setting up various special
considerations for distribution of TANF funds, some of which give disparate consideration
to unmarried couples and sometimes penalize them economically by withholding welfare
funds).
183 See Edin, supra note 38 (commenting on how many single mothers say they enjoy
being in control of their lives and do not want to be owned or to slave for their husbands);
see also Praveen Dalal, Empower Women (March 8, 2005), http://www.countercurrents.
org/gender-dala1080305.htm (discussing how women very often make huge sacrifices in
order to fully devote themselves to their families upon marriage).
184 See NOW, supra note 27, at 1-2 (suggesting that marriage promotion programs
divert welfare funds from more beneficial basic economic supports at a time of growing
poverty); see also Catholic Charities, supra note 175 (extrapolating from research done
over the past decade that "the most effective path to self-sufficiency for welfare recipients
is through a combination of work and education.").
185 See Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 ('The problems associated with poverty and
family instability can be solved only by a multi-pronged approach that includes:
investments in job training and education; interventions to help couples, married or
unmarried, parent more effectively; and accessible, affordable birth control in low-income
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the four goals of the 1996 TANF bill and allocated even more
TANF funding to experimental marriage promotion
programs.i8 6 The reauthorization champions these programs
and makes marriage promotion programs mandatory in every
state. 8 7 But this affirmation of untested programs is what
makes experts in the field nervous. A report published by the
Journal of Marital and Family Therapy stated, "the field of
[marital and family therapy] research is not ready for
definitive conclusions at this stage of its development...
most of the findings have not been replicated
systematically ... many methodological problems still plague
the research and hinder the accumulation of a coherent and
clear body of knowledge."188
David Fein of the Welfare Reform and Family Formation
Project comes to similar conclusions. Fein states, "[t]ruly
understanding the effect of welfare reforms on family
formation requires research strategies that take all these
various complexities into account ... the best evaluations to
date have devoted only superficial attention to these
matters."1 89 Fein discusses some preliminary findings, and
suggests that a women's disposition toward marriage is
formed before she is classified as a welfare recipient.190 Fein
communities to ensure that pregnancies are not unwanted or mistimed."); see also
Catholic Charities, supra note 175 (commenting on positive results of work and education
on welfare recipients' self-sufficiency).
186 See NOW, supra note 27, at 1 (noting that over $1.4 billion would be diverted to
untested marriage promotion programs over first few years of program); ROBERT E.
RECTOR & MELISSA G. PARDUE, BACKGROUNDER, UNDERSTANDING THE PRESIDENT'S
HEALTHY MARRIAGE INITIATIVE 5-6 (March 26, 2004) http://www.heritage.org/Research
/Family/upload/60463_l.pdf (describing funding and suggested programs under
President's Healthy Marriage Initiative).
187 See NOW, supra note 27, at 1 (commenting that house bill would "require every
state to have a marriage promotion program"); contra RECTOR & PARDUE, supra note 186,
at 5-6 (stating that "[a]ll participation in the President's marriage program would be
voluntary" and describing competitive funding plan).
188 William M. Pinsof & Lyman C. Wynne, The Efficacy of Marital and Family
Therapy: An Empirical Overview, Conclusions, and Recommendations, J. OF MARITAL AND
FAM. THERAPY, 21: 585-614 (Oct. 1995), available at http:l/findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_
qa3658/is_199510/ain8720965.
189 ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 4.
190 See DAVID FEIN, WELFARE REFORM AND FAMILY FORMATION PROJECT, WHAT DO
THEY THINK? WELFARE RECIPIENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIAGE AND CHILDBEARING 2
(2002), http://www.abtassociates.com/attachments/wrff-rb2.pdf (stating the difference in
marriage expectations between AFDC and non-AFDC recipients was only eleven percent,
seventy-one percent of AFDC women and eighty-two percent of non-AFDC women expect
to marry).
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reports that "welfare recipients see marriage as highly
desirable in the abstract, but do not assess their own
marriage prospects very favorably."191 These findings suggest
that marriage policies should focus more on making marriage
financially feasible, through job training and education
programs, rather then on counseling and community
programs. 192 While marriage counseling programs may be
helpful in maintaining marriage rates and discouraging
divorce, they do nothing to provide the financial stability that
promotes a healthy family life and stable upbringing for
children. 193
A tangential criticism of marriage promotion programs is
the concern that marriage initiatives ignore the dark reality
of domestic abuse among TANF recipients. 194  Statistics
indicate that between fifty to sixty percent of women
receiving welfare have been abused by a partner at some
point in their lives.195 Welfare programs should be reflective
and cognizant of the statistics relating to domestic violence in
low-income homes and recognize the evils that exist in many
women's lives in order to provide support, rather then
encouraging potentially dangerous and volatile situations.
191 ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 5.
192 See FEIN, supra note 190, at 7 (stating that welfare policies should be designed to
make marriage more economically feasible). See generally Smock & Coontz, supra note
107 (discussing the connection between economic and marital distress and how proven
programs that enhance one's economics are the best way to tackle the concerns with
marriage among the poor).
193 See FEIN, supra note 190, at 2 (arguing that single parents can raise children as
well as married couples can, suggesting there isn't a direct link to a child's well-being and
whether the parents of that child are married); Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 (arguing
that diverting funds from proven anti-poverty measures such as education, child care
assistance, and job training into marriage promotion programs among low-income
families may not have the effect that the government is intending by doing so).
194 See ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 1 (pointing out that marriage promotion
programs may lead to domestic violence in TANF recipients); SHARMILA LAWRENCE, NAT'L
CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE POLICY: RESEARCH
FINDINGS THAT CAN INFORM POLICIES ON MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING 2 (2002),
http://www.researchforum.org/media
/DomVio.pdf (discussing research findings pointing to the high rates of domestic abuse
among TANF recipients).
195 See Richard Tolman & Jody Raphael, A Review of the Research on Welfare and
Domestic Violence, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 655, 660 (2000) (stating that most rates of lifetime
domestic violence among women on welfare were in the fifty to sixty percent range);
ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 1 (stating that studies consistently show that at least fifty to
sixty percent of women receiving welfare have experienced physical abuse by an intimate
partner).
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Studies suggest that marital conflict rather then divorce is
a more important indicator of childhood adjustment. 196 A
study from Cornell University found that "the most important
factors [for child development] were the mother's level of
education, income level, and the quality of the home
environment, not marital status.197 These findings would
suggest that welfare reform legislation should focus primarily
on education and job training for women receiving welfare
rather then simply encouraging marriage, which may invite
domestic conflict.198 Furthermore, forty percent of families
living in poverty are two-parent families.199 This statistic
indicates that marriage and two parent families do not
guarantee economic stability and success. Policy needs to
reflect the reality of the situation; economic security improves
the likelihood that a marriage will be successful, but
marriage does not ensure economic security. 200
VIII. MARRIAGE PROMOTION ALTERNATIVES
One of the common reasons TANF recipients cited divorce
was because of economic hardship or financial instability. 20
TANF marriage promotion programs simply ignore the real
hardships welfare recipients face. While marriage, in and of
itself may be a desirable goal for many members of the
community, it is not a solution to poverty, and it is especially
196 See ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 6 (arguing that children in high-conflict
marriages are more likely to experience behavioral and academic problems); LAWRENCE,
supra note 195 (stating that much research demonstrates the serious negative effects on
children when exposed to domestic violence).
197 ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 6.
198 Id. at 7.
199 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS 6 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf
(providing statistical data on percentage of families below the poverty line).
200 See ASSESSING, supra note 100, at 6 (stating that research has led to the
hypothesis that increased income led to decreased relationship stress and conflict). But
see ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that because of death and divorce, getting
married does not ensure economic security); Edin, supra note 38 (pointing out that nearly
six out of ten new marriages end in divorce).
201 See Edin, supra note 38 (stating that welfare-reliant mothers have a consistent
need for supplemental income, and thus couples often break up over money); see also
Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 (discussing the connection between economic and
marital distress and that marriages are more likely to break up when a family's economic
situation is poor).
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not a legitimate justification for diverting much needed cash
assistance from the poorest of our communities. 202 Marriage
is often times, very simply, not a viable option for women
living in poverty, so no matter how many counseling and
education programs TANF endorses, and funds, marriage
promotion programs can not produce the results
policymakers' desire. 203 Marriage initiatives do not address
the four issues cited by Edin in her research as to why poor
women do not marry; namely, affordability, respectability,
trust and control. 204  These issues reflect the everyday
struggles of a mother living in poverty, and to these women,
marriage is just another hassle that will add to the instability
of her family. 205  TANF should focus on solving these
problems, not encourage marriage to a population that is
fighting for survival. TANF should provide adequate
education, job training, and child care programs that will
help alleviate the pressure of a single mother. Marriage is a
social goal that many women hope to achieve one day, but
marriage is not a surefire path to success. A welfare mother's
struggle is unique to the struggles and aspirations of the
middle class. While she may aspire to marriage one day, 206 at
this point in her life it is simply not the right choice. She
needs to first consider the welfare of her children, and make
herself financially and emotionally stable so that she become
independent on her own, before she considers jeopardizing
202 See Smock & Coontz, supra note 107 ('We are especially concerned when
unsupported claims are made about the effectiveness of programs that have never been
tested on the proposed target population. Such exaggerated claims have consequences.
Several states have already begun to license marriage education counselors, who
frequently receive training sessions of only two days, and to channel anti-poverty funds
into marriage training courses given by such newly-credentialed individuals."); see also
ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 7 (stating that focusing on marriage promotion will not lift
women out of poverty and Congress should strengthen existing provisions that support
women).
203 See ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 7 (stating that marriage promotional progress
can be potentially dangerous, and instead programs should support education and job
training); see also Edin, supra note 38 (discussing various theories of non-marriage).
204 See Edin, supra note 38. Edin interviewed unmarried poor women and categorized
these four factors as the main reasons for staying single. Id.
205 See Edin, supra note 38 (interviewing women who expressed various reasons for
staying unmarried); see also ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 5 (stating that marriage may
not improve poverty and may contribute to domestic violence instead).
206 See, e.g., FEIN, supra note 191, at 2 (showing that seventy-one percent of AFDR
recipients expect to marry).
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the welfare of her children by bringing another adult into
their home.
Welfare legislation should focus on practical programs that
produce tangible results. Programs that focus on education,
childcare assistance, and job training help a person succeed
on an individual level which leads to emotional independence
and financial stability.207 These are the types of programs
that help lift people out of poverty, and not just simply
disappear from the welfare rolls.208 Marriage promotion
programs distort the effectiveness of welfare policies by
focusing on individual's personal choices, rather than the
economic policies that created the situation they are in.
Poverty is not caused by deviant behavior, but rather a set of
circumstances that are caused by our political, economic, and
social structures. 209
People living in poverty should not be subject to judgment
from those who are more privileged simply because of their
misfortune. Marriage promotion policies are government-
sanctioned judgment of lifestyle choices. This narrow-
mindedness has no place in welfare policy. Public programs
should be free of moral judgment and focus on helping
families overcome poverty. Marriage promotion programs are
chock full of moral judgment and gender bias that simply
does not belong within the public assistance scheme.
207 See Smock & Coontz, supra note 107; see also ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 2.
Insuring services such as job training opportunities, childcare, and education should be
lawmakers' priority.
208 See ENDABUSE, supra note 27, at 7 ("Investments in education, training and work
supports can both empower women to achieve economic security ... and strengthen
marriages.").
209 See Doran & Roberts, supra note 75, at 399-400 (writing that welfare programs
"carry clear assumptions about the morality and motivations of welfare recipients" which
reinforce the notion that welfare recipients are the cause of social problems); see also
Williams, supra note 47, at 741 (arguing that the New Right's economic strategy created a
redistribution of money to the rich and increased poverty, and to legitimate the policy
blame was diverted to welfare-receivers who have not seized the opportunity to work and
thus deviated from national ideology).
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